McNamara's lessons from Vietnam

When former Defense Secretary Robert McNamara passed away recently, I covered his passing because he had a long history in Aspen and Snowmass Village. (McNamara had strong ties to Aspen) Say what you will about McNamara, he had a lifelong love of the mountains.

More importantly he worked hard in his later years to try and share the lessons he learned about the failures of Vietnam. In his book, "In Retrospect," he devotes a chapter to “The Lessons of Vietnam.” The lessons go beyond Colin Powell’s doctrine of “if you go in, go big.”

Here is an abridged versions of the 11 main lessons McNamara cited about Vietnam. They are very relevant to the current U.S. experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, etc., etc.

1. We misjudged then - as we have since - the geopolitical intentions of our adversaries ... and we exaggerated the dangers to the United States of our actions.

2. We viewed the people and leaders of (pick your country) in terms of our experience. We saw in them a thirst for - and a determination to fight for - freedom and democracy. We totally misjudged the political forces within the country.

3. We underestimated the power of nationalism to motivate a people to fight and die for their beliefs and values - and we continue to do so today in many parts of the world.

4. Or misjudgment of friend and foe alike reflected our profound ignorance of the history, culture, and politics of the people in the area, and the personalities and habits of their leaders.

5. We failed then - as we have since - to recognize the limitations of modern, high-technology military equipment, forces and doctrine in confronting unconventional, highly motivated people's movements. We failed as well to adapt our military tactics to the task of winning the hearts and minds people from a totally different culture.

6. We failed to draw Congress and the American people into a full and frank discussion and debate of the pros and cons of a large-scale U.S. military involvement in (pick your country) before we initiated the action.

7. After the action got under way and unanticipated events forced us off our planned course, we failed to retain popular support in part because we did not explain fully what was happening and why were doing what we did. We had not prepared the public to understand the complex events we faced and how to react constructively to the need for changes in course as the nation confronted uncharted seas and an alien environment. A nation's deepest strength lies not in its military prowess but, rather, in the unity of its people.

8. We did not recognize that neither our people nor our leaders are omniscient. Where are our own security is not directly at stake, our judgment of what is in the another peoples or country's best interests should be put to the test of open discussion in international forums. We do not have the God-given right to shape every nation in our own image or as we choose.

9. We did not hold to the principle that U.S. military action – other than in response to direct threats to our own security – should be carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces supported fully (and not merely cosmetically) by the international community.

10. We failed to recognize that in international affairs, as in other aspects of life, there may be problems for which there are no immediate solutions.

11. Underlying many of these errors lay our failure to organize the top echelons of the executive branch to deal effectively with the extraordinarily complex range of political and military issues, involving the great risks and costs – including above all else, loss of life – associated with the application of military force under substantial constraints over a long period of time.